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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 25, 2013, North Carolina began issuing special driver’s
licenses (N.C. licenses) to qualified undocumented immigrants protected
from removal under Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).1 The
front of the license contains the words “NO LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red
letters, conspicuously publicizing DACA grantees’ delicate immigration
status.2 The key issue is whether states can publicize the immigration status
of individuals who are protected from deportation by the federal government.
DACA preempts the N.C. licenses because the N.C. licenses draw attention
to DACA grantees’ immigration status in a way that frustrates the federal
policy to integrate DACA grantees.
On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration announced it would
defer any removal action for qualified undocumented immigrants under
DACA. 3 DACA preserves administrative resources by refocusing removal
efforts on “high priority” persons. 4 President Barack Obama stated that
DACA protects individuals who “are Americans in their heart, in their
minds, in every single way but . . . on paper,” by lifting “the shadow of
deportation from these young people.” 5 DACA does not grant any
immigration status but offers lawful presence in the U.S. and clears a path for
qualified immigrants to work legally and obtain driver’s licenses.6
According to recent statistics, forty-eight states permit DACA
grantees to apply for driver’s licenses.7 Though some states were initially

1

Michael Hennessey, Licenses for DACA Qualifiers Pink Stripe to be Removed,
WCTI 12 (Mar. 22, 2013, 7:40 PM), http://www.wcti12.com/news/Licenses-for-DACAqualifiers/-/13530444/19433972/-/dy8ys4/-/index.html.
2
Id.
3
See Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the
Absence of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter
Obama’s Ruby Slippers], http://ssrn.com/abstract=2238741; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United
States as Children (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter Napolitano] (on file with the author).
4
Napolitano, supra note 3.
5
John Cushman Jr. & Julia Preston, Obama to Permit Young Migrants to
Remain in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stopdeporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
6
Id.; See 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012).
7
NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., ARE INDIVIDUALS GRANTED DEFERRED ACTION
UNDER THE DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) POLICY ELIGIBLE FOR
STATE DRIVER’S LICENSES?, http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (last updated June
19, 2013); Larry Copeland, N.C.’s Immigrant Driver’s License Plan Sparks Protests, USA
TODAY (Mar. 8, 2013), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/07/ncs-immigrantdrivers-license-plan-sparks-protests/1972119/. See also Amanda P. Beadle, States Move
Forward to Allow Undocumented Immigrants to Drive Legally, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Apr.
29, 2013), http://immigrationimpact.com/2013/04/29/states-move-forward-to-allow-undocu
mented-immigrants-to-drive-legally/ (noting states’ increasing acceptance of providing
undocumented immigrants without deferred action status driver’s licenses).
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hesitant in issuing driver’s licenses to DACA grantees, only Arizona and
Nebraska expressly prohibit DACA grantees from obtaining licenses.8
North Carolina initially denied DACA grantees driver’s licenses, but
eventually issued special driver’s licenses to DACA grantees.9 The original
designs for the North Carolina licenses singled out DACA grantees with a
bright pink stripe.10 After much controversy, North Carolina issued licenses
to DACA grantees with “NO LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red letters on the
face of the license without the pink stripe.11
While DACA grantees are granted deferred action at the federal
level, the attention drawn to an individual’s immigration status by the N.C.
licenses is problematic at the local enforcement level. The N.C. licenses
draw attention to the precarious immigration status of DACA grantees. This
puts DACA grantees at risk of unnecessary detainment due to the interaction
between state law enforcement and Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 287(g) and Secured Communities (S-COMM) programs.12
The N.C. licenses affect a significant number of individuals. As of
March 14, 2013, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) received 469,530 applications, 338,334 of which are Mexican
applicants.13 USCIS has approved 453,589 applications.14 Of the applicants,
16,554 were North Carolina residents, the sixth most applicants from one

8
Copeland, supra note 7; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF STATE
DRIVER’S LICENSE REQUIREMENTS FOR INDIVIDUALS GRANTED DEFERRED ACTION UNDER THE
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA) POLICY, http://www.nilc.org/
dacadriverslicensestbl.html (last updated Apr. 9, 2013); Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06, 18
Ariz. Admin. Reg. 2237 (Sept. 7, 2012), available at http://www.azsos.gov/aar/
2012/36/governor.pdf (noting the Arizona executive order expressly states that it does not
recognize DACA’s validity and, therefore, does not recognize DACA grantees’ legal presence
in the U.S.).
9
Copeland, supra note 7.
10
Id.
11
Hennessey, supra note 1 (showing North Carolina also announced it will issue
specially marked driver’s licenses for all noncitizens including lawful permanent residents in
December 2013); See Bertrand M. Gutierrez, Planned N.C. Driver’s License Irks Some
Noncitizens, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Feb. 22, 2013), www.journalnow.com/news/local/article_
65c8a826-7d56-11e2-9d3b-001a4bcf6878.html.
12
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has phased out large parts
of the § 287(g) program. The “task force” model, in which state police are deputized to
enforce immigration laws in the regular course of their activities on the street have been
suspended. Michele Waslin, ICE Scaling Back 287(g) Program, IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Oct.
19, 2012), http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/10/19/ice-scaling-back-287g-program/; Alan
Gomez, Immigration Enforcement Program to be Shut Down, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2012,
3:25 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-17/immigration-enforce
ment-program/53134284/1.
13
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD
ARRIVALS PROCESS (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/
Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Ty
pes/DACA/daca-13-3-15.pdf (providing statistics from Aug. 15, 2012–Mar. 14, 2013).
14
Id.
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state.15 While comprehensive immigration reform seems on the horizon, the
N.C. licenses will remain an issue unless any new law settles the
immigration status of DACA grantees.16
Other scholars have focused on a potential equal protection
challenge to driver’s licenses such as the N.C. license.17 Given the Supreme
Court’s focus on federalism and preemption in the immigration law context,
this article analyzes N.C. driver’s licenses in light of the Supreme Court’s
use of obstacle preemption in Arizona v. United States.18
DACA preempts N.C. licenses because the licenses disrupt the
federal government’s careful balance of policy goals to integrate qualified
“low priority” undocumented immigrants and focus removal efforts on “high
priority” criminals by drawing undue attention to DACA grantees’ lack of
lawful status.19 Additionally, the N.C. licenses’ interaction with state “show
me your papers” laws, § 287(g), and S-COMM exacerbates such disruption
of federal policy goals because the “no lawful status” language on the N.C.
licenses subjects DACA grantees to an increased risk of wrongful detention.
Most troubling is how a N.C. license holder would fare in Arizona, where
DACA grantees’ lawful presence is ignored. 20 Therefore, N.C. licenses
would offer no protection from Arizona law enforcement.21
15

Id.
Rosalind S. Helderman & Sean Sullivan, Bipartisan Group of Senators to
Unveil Framework for Immigration Overhaul, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2013),
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bipartisan-group-of-senators-to-unveil-framework-forimmigration-overhaul/2013/01/27/bdb04360-68bf-11e2-ada3-d86a4806d5ee_story.html; Dan
Nowicki, ‘Amnesty’ Losing Emotional Punch in Immigration Debate, USA TODAY (June 19,
2013), www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/07/19/amnesty-losing-emotional-punchimmigration-debate/2567509/. Under the current bill, undocumented immigrants must wait ten
years and pay certain fines before becoming a permanent resident. Nowicki, supra. Even if the
bill is passed, the status of undocumented immigrants would not be immediately resolved. Id.
17
See María Pabón López, More Than A License to Drive: State Restrictions on
the Use of Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 104 (2005) (examining
several types of driver’s licenses that can be issued to noncitizens, including N.C. licenses,
which Professor López describes as “branding”). Note that an equal protection challenge
would offer substantive rights to affected immigrants and would not be vulnerable to changing
political views, unlike the DACA program, which is vulnerable to shifting political views.
18
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
19
See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3; Ernest A. Young, Executive
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 869 (2008); Peter Marguiles, Taking Care of Immigration
Law: Presidential Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers
(Roger Williams University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 133, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2215255.
20
The ACLU, the ACLU of Arizona, the National Immigration Law Center
(NILC), and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), filed a
suit challenging Governor Brewer’s executive order in the U.S. District Court in Phoenix on
behalf of DACA grantees who were denied Arizona driver’s licenses. ACLU, American
Dream Act Coalition, et al v. Brewer (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/immigrantsrights/arizona-dream-act-coalition-et-al-v-brewer. The lawsuit asserts that Arizona’s executive
order violates the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution by interfering with federal
immigration law and also violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by
discriminating against certain non-citizens. Id. The Court held that Arizona did not have
16
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Part II provides a background of DACA and the N.C. licenses.22 Part
III provides a brief overview of Arizona v. United States and modern
obstacle preemption jurisprudence. 23 Part IV begins by exploring the
interaction between licenses and state law, § 287(g) and S-COMM, and how
N.C. licenses are obstacle preempted.24 To illustrate the interaction between
N.C. licenses with state and federal law, a hypothetical is set forth where a
N.C. license holder is stopped by local law enforcement and is subsequently
put through § 287(g) and S-COMM processes.25 Part IV then examines how
Arizona law exacerbates the effect of the N.C. licenses.26 Finally, Part V
concludes that the N.C. licenses are preempted, thus unconstitutional.27
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Creation of the DACA Program to Protect Qualified Individuals
from Deportation
DACA was created to protect qualified undocumented immigrants
from removal and was intended to protect undocumented immigrants who
are “Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on
paper.”28 On June 15, 2012, the Obama administration announced that the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would exercise its prosecutorial
discretion to defer action for qualified undocumented immigrants who
arrived in the U.S. as children.29
Janet Napolitano, the Secretary of Homeland Security, issued a
memorandum instructing ICE and USCIS to defer removal action for
qualified individuals for a renewable two-year period. 30 To qualify for
DACA protection, individuals must meet each of the following criteria:
(i) entered the U.S. before they turned sixteen; (ii) are not older than thirtyone; (iii) have continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007,
up to the present time; (iv) were physically present in the United States on
rational basis to deny DACA grantees driver’s licenses, but it also denied the plaintiffs’
request for a preliminary injunction against the Arizona policy. Federal Court Says Arizona
Violates Constitution by Denying Licenses to DREAMers, COMMON DREAMS (May 17, 2013),
https://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2013/05/17
[hereinafter
Arizona
Violates
Constitution].
21
See Complaint ¶¶ 44–49, Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, No. 2:12-cv-02546,
2013 WL 2128315 (D. Az. May 16, 2012), 2012 WL 5952174; Ariz. Exec. Order 2012–06;
Arizona Violates Constitution, supra note 20.
22
See infra Part II.
23
See infra Part III.
24
See infra Part IV.
25
See infra Part IV.
26
See infra Part IV.
27
See infra Part V.
28
Cushman & Preston, supra note 5.
29
Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 15; Napolitano, supra note 3.
30
Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1–3.
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June 15, 2012, and at the time of making the DACA application;
(v) graduated high school, attended college, or served in the military; and
(vi) do not have a significant criminal background. 31 DACA grantees are
eligible for employment authorization and a Social Security number.32
DHS has reiterated that DACA grantees are lawfully present, despite
lacking formal immigration status. 33 Lawful status is distinct from lawful
presence. 34 An individual can lack lawful status but still be lawfully
present. 35 Unlawful presence applies to an individual who is physically
present in the U.S. without lawful status (i.e. a lawful permanent resident, an
asylee or refugee, a visa holder, or a parolee).36 However, DHS can stop the
accrual of unlawful presence of an individual without lawful status as a
matter of prosecutorial discretion. 37 In such a case, an individual can be
lawfully present in the U.S. without lawful status. Accordingly, a DACA
grantee will not accrue any unlawful presence once granted DACA status,
although any unlawful presence prior to obtaining DACA status is not
forgiven.38
Generally, individuals who are unlawfully present are ineligible for
federal public benefits.39 Such individuals may also be ineligible for state
public benefits, but states have discretion to offer public benefits to
unlawfully present individuals.40
With lawful presence, DACA grantees can access state public
benefits and various state licenses. 41 Providing access to state driver’s
licenses is central to the Obama administration’s goal to integrate DACA

31

Id.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED
ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS PROCESS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (last visited
Mar. 12, 2013) [hereinafter USCIS FAQ], http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=3a4dbc4b04499310VgnVCM10
0000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=3a4dbc4b04499310VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD.
33
Id.
34
8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a)(1), 1641 (2012); Memorandum from Donald Neufeld,
Acting Associate Director of USCIS, on Consolidation of Guidance Concerning Unlawful
Presence for Purposes of Sections 212(a)(9)(B)(i) and 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)—Revision to and Redesignation of Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 30.1(d) as Chapter 40.9 at 10
(AFM Update AD 08-03) (May 6, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/
Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_Memoranda/2009/revision_redesign_AFM.PDF [hereinafter
Neufeld].
35
Neufeld, supra note 34, at 9–10.
36
Id. at 10; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 1182(d)(5), 1621(a)(1)(3), 1641 (2012).
37
Neufeld, supra note 34, at 9–10.
38
USCIS FAQ, supra note 32; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2012) (noting
“[n]o period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken into account in
determining the period of unlawful presence”).
39
See 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012).
40
§ 1621(a), (d).
41
See § 1621(c).
32
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grantees. 42 Indeed, state driver's licenses are essentially de facto national
identification cards and are vital to daily activities.43 Driver’s licenses are
used to prove identity in many situations, including, but not limited to,
opening bank accounts, cashing checks, and using credit cards.44
DACA was announced in response to Congress’s inability to pass
the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act.45
In light of legislative inaction, law school professors outlined the legal
authority for deferred action in a letter to President Obama and urged the
President to take executive action.46 The letter explained that INA § 103(a)
grants the Secretary of Homeland Security broad authority to exercise
prosecutorial discretion, and deferred action is a form of prosecutorial
discretion historically used by the executive branch.47
DACA’s opponents question its legality. 48 Kris Kobach, Kansas’s
Secretary of State and the primary author of Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1051
(2010), better known as Arizona S.B. 1070, filed a complaint against the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the director of ICE on behalf of ICE
officers claiming that DACA is unconstitutional and violates administrative
law procedural requirements.49 The State of Mississippi joined the complaint
two months later.50 Despite the backlash, many undocumented immigrants
are applying for deferred action.51
DACA grantees, as immigrants without lawful status, are vulnerable
to detention during investigation of their immigration status. Under § 287(g)
and S-COMM, ICE may access DACA grantees’ immigration information
42
Kevin R. Johnson, Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The
Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213, 221 (2004).
43
Id.
44
Paul L. Frantz, Undocumented Workers: State Issuance of Driver Licenses
Would Create A Constitutional Conundrum, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505, 532 (2004).
45
Cushman & Preston, supra note 5.
46
See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 15.
47
Letter from Immigration Law Professors, Executive Authority to Grant
Administrative Relief to Dream Act Beneficiaries, to President Obama (May 28, 2012) (on
file with author).
48
Cushman & Preston, supra note 5; Andres Gonzalez & Alicia Caldwell,
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, Obama Immigration Program, Begins Taking
Applications, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2012), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
08/15/deferred-action-for-childhood-arrivals_n_1778834.html.
49
Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247, 2013 WL 1744422
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013), 2012 WL 3629252 (arguing DACA was enacted without proper
notice and comment per the Administrative Procedure Act and in turn does not have the force
of law and impedes DHS officers from enforcing INA § 235).
50
Amended Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247, 2013 WL
1744422 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013), 2012 WL 5199509.
51
As of Aug. 31, 2013, USCIS has received 588,725 applications, 433,318 of
which are Mexican applicants. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DACA MONTHLY
REPORT 1–2 (Sep. 11, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/
daca-13-9-11.pdf. USCIS has approved 455,455 applications. Id. There were 19,876
applicants residing in North Carolina, the seventh most applicants from one state. Id.
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for removal purposes. Under INA § 287(g), states in current contracts with
DHS only implement the Detention Model, where local jail officers are
trained to screen inmates for potential immigration violations.52 If the local
jail officers believe an individual is removable, they can then inform ICE,
which may issue a detainer. 53 Under S-COMM, the fingerprints of
individuals arrested by local law enforcement are checked against the FBI
criminal history database and the DHS biometric databases.54 If the federal
database shows that the individual is removable, it will issue a “detainer” to
local law enforcement requesting the arrested individual be detained until
ICE agents interview and determine whether or not to transfer the individual
to ICE custody. 55 An arrest for any infraction, no matter how minor, is
sufficient to trigger a § 287(g) detainer or S-COMM database check.56 No
conviction is necessary for ICE to issue a detainer.57
State and local law enforcement act as gatekeepers with the initial
discretion to determine how to proceed with an arrested individual under
both § 287(g) and S-COMM.58 As an illustration of the importance of local
law enforcement’s discretion, police decisions to stop drivers for minor
traffic violations have frequently led to detention of Latino immigrants under
the § 287(g) program.59
52
Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2012: ICE
Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New
National Detainer Guidance to Further Focus Resources (Dec. 21, 2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm#statement.
53
Id.; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACT SHEET:
DELEGATION OF IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY SECTION 287(G) IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ACT, (Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (showing five
counties in North Carolina are currently enrolled in § 287(g)).
54
U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_ communities/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
55
Edgar Aguilasocho, Misplaced Priorities: The Failure of Secure Communities
in Los Angeles County (University of California Irvine Legal Studies Research Paper No. 118,
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2012283.
56
Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil—Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819,
1851 (2011).
57
Aguilasocho, supra note 55; See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
ACTIVATED
JURISDICTIONS,
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/sc-activated2.pdf (last updated July 31, 2012) (noting that, as of July 2012,
97% of U.S. jurisdictions have activated S-COMM, including every North Carolina county
resulting in the removal of 4,085 undocumented immigrants).
58
Motomura, supra note 56, at 1856.
59
Angela M. Banks, The Curious Relationship Between “Self-Deportation”
Policies and Naturalization Rates, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149, 1181–82 (2012). ICE
statistics contain the following information:
Thirty percent of all ICE detainers issued nationwide in 2010
pursuant to 287(g) agreements were based on traffic offenses . . . . These
numbers suggest that the police officers responsible for the most trafficbased arrests leading to ICE detainers were patrol officers with no specific
authority or mandate to enforce immigration law. Patrol officers do not
need 287(g) authority to support immigration enforcement; they just need
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B. Background on Driver’s Licenses for Undocumented Immigrants
Generally, states have wide latitude in determining whether to issue
driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants.60 Even before September 11,
2001, several states prohibited undocumented immigrants from obtaining
driver’s licenses to discourage immigration. 61 After September 11, state
efforts to deny undocumented immigrants driver’s licenses greatly
increased.62
The lack of a driver’s license directly threatens the livelihood of
immigrants because driving is the most important mode of transportation in
the U.S. 63 To meet their daily needs, some undocumented immigrants
continue to drive without licenses and are often unable to obtain automobile
insurance because of their unlicensed status.64 Consequently, there are safety
concerns regarding undocumented immigrants who are unable to legally
drive.65
Moreover, as noted previously, driver’s licenses issued by the states
are essentially de facto national identification cards.66 The denial of driver’s
licenses injures immigrants by exacerbating fears of arrest and deportation,
limiting access to jobs, and generally increasing vulnerability to exploitation
in the workplace and elsewhere.67 Indeed, the lack of a license more likely
relegates a person to the secondary labor market, with low wages and poor
conditions.68
C. Background of North Carolina Driver’s Licenses and Recent State
Legislation
North Carolina wavered several times between issuing and not
issuing licenses to DACA grantees.69 The North Carolina Division of Motor
to operate within a jurisdiction in which the immigration status of all
arrested individuals is checked.
Id. See also AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TENN., CONSEQUENCES AND COSTS: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE’S JAIL MODEL 287(G) PROGRAM, (2012),
http://www.aclu-tn.org/pdfs/287g(F).pdf (reporting Tennessee law enforcement making
pretextual arrests and jailing individuals for § 287(g) jail program purposes).
60
See Johnson, supra note 42, at 219.
61
López, supra note 17, at 95.
62
Id. at 96.
63
Id. at 96–97.
64
Id. at 97–98.
65
Id.
66
Johnson, supra note 42, at 221.
67
Id. at 221–22.
68
Id.
69
Franco Ordoñez, N.C. Switches Stance on Driver’s Licenses for Illegal
Immigrants, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Jan. 11, 2013), www.charlotteobserver.com/
2013/01/11/3778691/nc-switches-stance-on-licenses.html; Copeland, supra note 7; North
Carolina Suspends Issuing Driver’s Licenses to DREAMers, FOX NEWS (Jan. 9, 2013),
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Vehicles (N.C. DMV) ultimately decided to issue licenses to DACA grantees
after the state Attorney General explained that “lawful presence” under
DACA comports with federal law as well as the state’s driver’s license
laws. 70 North Carolina’s Department of Transportation (N.C. DOT)
announced that it would issue DACA grantees licenses with a pink stripe and
the words “NO LAWFUL STATUS” and “LIMITED TERM” starting on
March 25, 2013.71
Republican Governor of North Carolina Pat McCrory called the pink
stripes “a pragmatic compromise.”72 The N.C. DOT maintained that the pink
stripes were necessary to combat fraud, specifically voter fraud.73 Currently,
the back of issued North Carolina licenses discreetly indicates that a license
holder is not a U.S. citizen by stating the validity period of the noncitizen’s
authorized presence.74
DACA applicants expressed concerns about being singled out on
account of their immigration status. 75 Religious groups in North Carolina
also criticized the state’s decision to issue the pink licenses and have
described the licenses as “punitive.”76
In light of such controversy, the N.C. DOT removed the pink stripe
days before March 25, 2013. 77 The redesigned licenses issued to DACA
grantees still state “NO LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red letters on the front
of the license. 78 To obtain licenses, DACA grantees need to demonstrate
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/01/09/n-carolina-suspends-issuing-driverlicenses-to-dreamers/.
70
Copeland, supra note 7. The Office of North Carolina Attorney General Roy
Cooper provided that under state statute, the N.C. DMV is required to issue driver’s licenses
to applicants with legal presence in the U.S. Id. The Attorney General recognized that DACA
granted lawful presence without providing any formal immigration status. Id. Thus, the
Attorney General concluded that DACA grantees are lawfully present for the purposes of state
law, therefore they meet the state statutory requirement of legal presence for driver’s licenses.
Id.
71
Id.; Gutierrez, supra note 11.
72
Kim Severson, North Carolina to Give Some Immigrants Driver’s Licenses,
with a Pink Stripe, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/us/northcarolina-to-give-some-immigrants-drivers-licenses-with-a-pink-stripe.html (noting it is not
clear what points are “compromised” according to Governor McCrory). Given that DACA
grantees are lawfully present for a limited duration, they are presumably entitled to state
benefits, such as driver’s licenses for the same duration. Id.
73
Gutierrez, supra note 11.
74
Id.
75
Severson, supra note 72.
76
Id.
77
North Carolina: Pink Licenses Dropped, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013),
www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/us/north-carolina-pink-licenses-dropped.html;
Hennessey,
supra note 1 (explaining that the N.C. DOT removed the pink stripe to ensure that it would
meet the Mar. 25, 2013 deadline).
78
Hennessey, supra note 1; Pink Stripes Dropped From Driver’s Licenses for
Illegal Immigrants, WRAL (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.wral.com/pink-stripe-dropped-fromdriver-s-licenses-for-illegal-immigrants/12252934/ (noting North Carolina plans to issue these
licenses in December 2013); see also Colleen Jenkins, Immigrants Decry ‘Scarlet Letter’
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DACA status. 79 As of March 27, 2013, 693 DACA grantees in North
Carolina received driver’s licenses, permits, or identification cards.80
On April 10, 2013, North Carolina House Republicans took a further
step and introduced H.B. 786. The bill proposed driver’s licenses for
undocumented immigrants.81 The bill also proposed the addition of § 15A506 to the North Carolina General Statutes, which would allow law
enforcement officers to check the immigration status of anyone they stop and
detain them for up to twenty-four hours. 82 Recently, the bill’s sponsors
offered an amendment to the bill requesting the Department of Public Safety
study the ideas proposed in the bill. 83 The state agency will submit its
findings and recommendations to a legislative oversight committee by March
2014.84
Driver’s Licenses in N.C., THOMAS REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/us-usa-immigration-licenses-idUSBRE92D0TL20
130314. Alabama will also issue specially marked driver’s licenses to DACA grantees, but
unlike the North Carolina licenses, driver’s licenses of all noncitizens, including lawful
permanent residents will be identically marked with “FN.” Id. Thus, DACA grantees are not
distinguished like they are in North Carolina. Id.
79
N.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DACA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,
http://www.ncdot.gov/download/dmv/DACA/DACA_FAQs_English.pdf (last visited Mar. 31,
2013), (noting, per the N.C. DMV’s website, a DACA grantee must present proof of “lawful
status,” which likely means any USCIS receipt notices of approval demonstrating DACA
status). The N.C. DOT also announced plans to issue special driver’s licenses for all
noncitizens, including lawful permanent residents Id.; see Gutierrez, supra note 11; see also
Jenkins, supra note 78.
80
Kellen Moore, No Local DACA Participants Seek Licenses, WATAUGA
DEMOCRAT (Mar. 29, 2013), www2.wataugademocrat.com/News/story/No-local-DACAparticipants-seek-licenses-id-010952.
81
H.B. 786, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2013); Rebecca Leber, North
Carolina GOP Files Arizona Style “Show Me Your Papers” Bill (Apr. 12, 2013, 10:30 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/04/12/1855831/north-carolina-arizona-immigration-bill/
(showing undocumented immigrants who have lived in the state for at least one year may
obtain driver’s licenses). The licenses given to undocumented immigrants, however, will be
different from regular driver’s licenses and will be even more distinct than the N.C. licenses
for DACA grantees. Leber, supra. The licenses will be vertical and contain the cardholder’s
fingerprint. Id.
82
H.R. 786; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU: N.C. BILL WOULD LEAD TO
RACIAL PROFILING (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-racial-justice/aclunc-bill-would-lead-racial-profiling (showing North Carolina republicans seek to adopt a
“show me your papers” law akin to Arizona’s). The bill would also make it harder for
undocumented immigrants to post bail, require anyone who is undocumented and arrested to
pay the cost of their detention, and would allow law enforcement to impound and seize the
vehicles of undocumented drivers. Id. Additionally, North Carolina driver’s license applicants
must present proof of residency, which currently can be satisfied by “Immigration and
Naturalization Services” documents or a Matricula Consular issued by the Mexican Consulate,
but the bill prohibits the use of a Matricula Consular for such purposes. Id.
83
NC Immigration Bill Turned Mostly Into a Study, WSCO TV (July 17, 2013,
6:04 AM), http://www.wsoctv.com/news/news/local/nc-immigration-bill-turned-mostly-study/
nYsj6/ (explaining the bill has been transformed into an informational research and study bill
rather than actual legislation).
84
Id.
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III. OVERVIEW OF ARIZONA V. UNITED STATES AND THE
PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
A. General Background on Preemption Analysis and Case Law
The Supreme Court has recognized that federal power over
immigration is plenary and exclusive in some instances.85 The Supremacy
Clause provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . .” 86 Accordingly, the federal government may preempt otherwise
valid state law.87
Preemption can be express or implied.88 Express preemption occurs
when federal law specifically states that it precludes a state or locality from
regulating a particular field.89 Implied preemption includes field and conflict
preemption.90 Field preemption exists when the federal government creates a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that crowds out state legislation in a
particular field.91 Courts generally adopt a presumption against preemption
where Congress acts in a field that states traditionally occupy.92
Conflict preemption occurs when there is a direct conflict between
federal and state law making it impossible to comply with both federal and
state law.93 Obstacle preemption is a subset of conflict preemption existing
when state law creates an obstacle to a federal law’s policy goals and
objectives.94 The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona offers guidance as to
how the N.C. licenses are obstacle preempted under obstacle preemption
jurisprudence prior to Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting.95
B. Obstacle Preemption Jurisprudence Pre-Whiting
In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court relied on legislative history to hold
that Pennsylvania’s Alien Registration Act was an obstacle to the federal

85

See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 26 (1982).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
87
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500.
88
See Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Preemption may be either expressed or implied and is compelled whether Congress’ command is
explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.”)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
89
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1824); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501
(1912); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989).
90
Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of
McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 159 (2012) [hereinafter Immigrant Laws].
91
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citation omitted).
92
Id.
93
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963).
94
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 65 (1941).
95
See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2492; See also David A. Martin, Reading Arizona,
98 Va. L. Rev. 41 (2012).
86
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government’s “plainly manifested” purpose.96 The state law required adult
noncitizens to register annually, pay a fee, carry their alien identification card
at all times, and show it upon request.97 Noncitizens who failed to register or
carry their card were subject to fines. 98 A year after Pennsylvania passed the
law, Congress enacted the federal Alien Registration Act. The Act did not
require noncitizens to carry a registration card, but criminalized willful
failure to register.99
In striking down the state law, the Court stated that rules and
regulations touching on “the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of
aliens” implicate the federal foreign affairs power. 100 Moreover, “states
cannot, inconsistently with the purposes of Congress, conflict or interfere
with, curtail or complement the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary
regulations.” 101 The Court balanced the federal government’s policy goals
against the effects of the state law and emphasized that the federal
government sought to “protect the personal liberties of law-abiding aliens
through one uniform national registration system, and to leave them free
from the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that
might not only affect our international relations but might also generate the
very disloyalty which the law has intended guarding against.”102
Similarly, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the Court
held that a Presidential executive order obstacle preempted a Massachusetts
statute.103 The Court focused on the executive intent and broad foreign policy
concerns underlying the executive order to determine that the state law
interfered with the President’s authority to speak on foreign policy matters
which impeded the development and execution of a national policy
concerning Burma (Myanmar).104
The Supreme Court has held that a state law may be an obstacle to
achieving the purposes of a federal law when it balances policy goals

96

Hines, 312 U.S. at 74; See also Immigrant Laws, supra note 90, at 202 (“Hines
v. Davidowitz frequently has been categorized in the literature as a field preemption case,
even though the Court used the language of obstacle preemption in striking down
Pennsylvania’s registration requirements.”).
97
Hines, 312 U.S. at 5960.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 60–61
100
Id at 62–63.
101
Id. at 66–67.
102
Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
103
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
104
Id. at 376–84 (“The state Act undermines the President’s capacity, in this
instance for effective diplomacy. It is not merely that the differences between the state and
federal Acts in scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions; they
compromise the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in
dealing with other governments.”) (emphasis added). The Court examined congressional
intent in delegating power to the executive to handle relations and economic sanctions with
Burma. Id.
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differently than federal law.105 In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., the Court found that the state law at issue was preempted because it
struck the balance between “the encouragement of invention and free
competition in unpatented ideas” differently than federal law.106 Similarly, in
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., the Court held that tort claims
under state law for misrepresenting products to the FDA were obstacle
preempted because the “balance sought by the Administration can be skewed
by allowing fraud-on-the-FDA claims under state tort law.”107
In Lozano v. Hazelton, the Third Circuit adopted a similar balancing
approach in examining obstacle preemption in the immigration context.108
The court then found that the local ordinance regulating employment of
undocumented immigrants and prohibiting rentals to undocumented
immigrants was obstacle preempted.109 The court examined Congress’ efforts
to carefully balance multiple policy objectives by extensively searching the
legislative history and the overall structure of the Immigration and Reform
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).110 Ultimately, the court found that the Hazleton
ordinance chose to prioritize only one of the various policies considered by
Congress and disregarded Congress’ other objectives.111
C. The Supreme Court’s Decisions in Whiting and Arizona
However, in Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, the Court
deviated from the fact-intensive balancing.112 The Court examined the Legal
Arizona Workers Act (LAWA), which provides that the licenses of “state
employers who knowingly or intentionally employ unauthorized aliens” may
be revoked under certain circumstances. 113 LAWA also requires every
employer “[to] verify the employment eligibility of the employee by using EVerify . . . .”114
105

See, e.g., Arizona, 489 U.S. at 157–58; Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000) (noting the Court held that such a tort action would frustrate the DOT’s
goal of permitting automobile manufacturers wide discretion in choosing safety devices);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
106
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157–58 (showing the Court examined the state
statute which prohibited the use of a particular process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls
conflicted with federal law that promoted free competition in unpatented areas).
107
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001)
(determining that it would undermine federal policy to allow state law tort claimants to negate
the FDA’s finding that the manufacturer made a valid application for FDA approval).
108
Immigrant Laws, supra note 90, at 176.
109
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 210 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S.
Ct. 2958 (2011), remanded to 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013).
110
Lozano, 620 F.3d at 210 (noting “it is indisputable that Congress went to
considerable lengths in enacting IRCA to achieve a careful balance among its competing
policy objectives of effectively deterring employment of unauthorized aliens. . . ”).
111
Id. at 219.
112
See infra Part III.
113
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011).
114
Id. at 1976–77.
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The Court found the state law at issue was not preempted.115 The
Court held that the provision revoking business licenses was not expressly
preempted. 116 The Court broadly interpreted “licensure” in the business
context and held that LAWA fell within the scope of IRCA’s savings
clause. 117 The Court found it significant that Arizona relied solely on the
federal government’s determination of who is an unauthorized individual,
which in turn was not in contention with federal law.118 Finally, the Court
held that the LAWA licensure provision was not obstacle preempted and
refused to engage in a “freewheeling . . . inquiry into whether a state statute
is in tension with federal objectives” to determine whether federal law
preempted LAWA.119
In stark contrast to the Whiting Court’s reluctance to utilize a
searching obstacle preemption analysis, the Court in Arizona relied on
legislative history to find congressional intent obstacle preempted two of the
four challenged provisions of S.B. 1070. 120 Indeed, the Court in Arizona
seemed to revisit the broad pre-Whiting obstacle preemption analysis.121
First, the Court held that the portion of the law criminalizing failure
to carry immigration documents was field preempted.122 Second, the Court
stated that “even complementary state regulation is impermissible” where
Congress has adopted a comprehensive regulatory scheme.123
The Court then relied on obstacle preemption to uphold a
preliminary injunction against the provision of the law that imposed criminal
penalties on immigrants who work without employment authorization.124 The
Court examined the text, structure, and legislative history of IRCA to
determine that the state law criminalizing immigrant workers was an obstacle
to the regulatory scheme enacted by Congress. 125 The Court held that the
provision interfered with “the careful balance struck by Congress with
respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although § 5(C) attempts to
achieve one of the same goals as federal law . . . it involves a conflict in the
method of enforcement.”126 The Court in Arizona deviated from Whiting and
examined a wide range of legislative background materials, including

115

Id. at 1985–87.
Id. at 1981.
117
Id. at 1980.
118
Id. at 1981.
119
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985.
120
Martin, supra note 95, at 43 (noting that the Arizona Court’s reliance on
obstacle preemption was a surprise, particularly because the Arizona law in Whiting, which
was far more specific and closer to federal law, managed to withstand an obstacle preemption
challenge).
121
See infra Part III.
122
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503.
123
Id. at 2502.
124
Id. at 2505.
125
Id.
126
Id.
116
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Congressional studies, recommendations, and hearings to ascertain the
federal objectives underlying IRCA.127
The section allowing state law enforcement to arrest noncitizens who
commit “removable offenses” without a warrant was similarly struck down
as the Court held that Arizona law enforcement would have greater authority
to enforce immigration laws than federal immigration officers.128 The Court
examined a guidance memorandum issued by DHS to determine what factors
the federal government perceived to be crucial in determining whether to
prosecute a removable individual and found that the state law was an
obstacle to federal objectives.129 In striking down the provision, the Court
expressed concerns that the law “could [result in] unnecessary harassment of
some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or someone assisting
with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not be
removed,” presenting an obstacle to the federal enforcement scheme.130
The Court found no facial flaw in the “show me your papers” law,
but stated that it could be challenged as applied, particularly in situations
involving racial profiling and violations of the Fourth Amendment.131 The
Court left the door open for future challenges to “show me your papers”
laws.132
IV. NORTH CAROLINA LICENSES ARE OBSTACLE PREEMPTED
BY DACA BECAUSE THEY HINDER FEDERAL POLICY
OBJECTIVES
The central issue regarding the N.C. licenses is whether states can
publicize the immigration status of individuals protected from removal by
the federal government, drawing attention to the individuals’ immigration
statuses. As a general matter, states have the authority to issue driver’s

127

Id. at 2504–05. The opinion held that:
In the end, IRCA’s framework reflects a considered judgment that
making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work—aliens who
already face the possibility of employer exploitation because of their
removable status—would be inconsistent with federal policy and
objectives . . . . Under § 5(C) of S.B. 1070, Arizona law would interfere
with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized
employment of aliens. Although § 5(C) attempts to achieve one of the
same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it
involves a conflict in the method of enforcement.
Id. (citations omitted).
128
Id. at 2506.
129
Id. at 2505.
130
Id. at 2506 (emphasis added).
131
Id. at 2510.
132
Id.
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licenses. 133 However, federal legislation may preempt state legislation
regarding driver’s licenses.134
The Supreme Court has recognized that it is within the absolute
discretion of the executive branch to not pursue immigration enforcement
action.135 As such, any exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the executive
branch may preempt otherwise valid state legislation regarding driver’s
licenses. In the immigration context, DHS frequently exercises its
prosecutorial discretion to “defer action.”136 DHS has used “deferred action”
in various contexts to ensure efficient resource allocation with an eye toward
humanitarian concerns.137 Examples of individuals receiving deferred action
include survivors of domestic violence with approved VAWA self-petitions
who are not immediately eligible to adjust and certain widows of U.S.
citizens who are ineligible for immigration status. 138 DACA is merely an
extension of DHS’s policy to not remove “low priority” aliens.139 Indeed,
Napolitano’s memo adopted measures to ensure federal resources are not
wasted on removing “low priority” DACA grantees.140
As a threshold matter, before examining N.C. licenses under the
preemption framework, it should be noted that DACA is not legislation
created by Congress, nor is it a federal regulation created from formal

133

See López, supra note 17.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
135
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). “This Court has recognized
on several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce,
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s
absolute discretion.” Id.
136
Napolitano, supra note 3, at 2–3.
137
Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 7, 37. See also Lennon v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (2012). Arguably,
one of the more prominent examples of “deferred action,” then termed “nonpriority status.”
Id. (noting John Lennon was found to be eligible for deferred action despite a prior drug
conviction).
138
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS ESTABLISHES INTERIM RELIEF FOR WIDOWS OF
U.S. CITIZENS (June 9, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/06/09/dhs-establishes-interimrelief-widows-us-citizens.
139
See Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of
ICE, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with Civil Immigration Enforcement
Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17,
2011) (on file with the author) (setting forth the different priority levels of removable
individuals and stating that that only higher priority level individuals should be pursued and
removed); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of ICE, on Civil Immigration Enforcement:
Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) (explaining
the focus of enforcement resources on high priority individuals); Memorandum from John
Morton, Dir. of ICE, on Guidance Regarding the Handling of Removal Proceedings of Aliens
with Pending or Approved Applications or Petitions (Aug. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Morton
Memo] (terminating removal proceedings of persons with pending applications for status in
certain instances and essentially directing ICE not to use enforcement resources on “low
priority” persons).
140
Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1.
134
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rulemaking processes per the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 141 A
potential issue in determining the viability of the DACA program is whether
the Obama administration overstepped constitutional bounds by announcing
the policy.142
Indeed, recent litigation brought forth by Kris Kobach, ICE officials,
and the State of Mississippi seeks to dismantle the DACA program by
arguing that it is unconstitutional.143 Scholars have also expressed concerns
regarding the constitutionality of preemption by federal agencies and the
executive branch.144
However, Professor Lauren Gilbert argued DACA falls within the
policy exception to rule making under the APA.145 Furthermore, she argued
that DACA is the result of the Secretary of Homeland Security’s broad
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) to establish rules and regulations to
further the goals of the INA.146 Professor David A. Martin also argued that
the plain language of the INA does not prevent DHS from exercising its
prosecutorial discretion through DACA.147
141

Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 28.
See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law,
64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565, 572 (2012) (noting “Nonlegislative rules” are nonbinding and do not
have the force of law, while legislative rules are binding and have the force of law). Generally,
legislative rules create a “new law” that results in a substantive change. Id. There are various
criteria for determining whether an agency document (i.e. policy memoranda) is indeed
binding. Id. (noting the various procedural concerns that nonlegislative rules raises,
particularly in the immigration law context). William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules,
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2001) (providing a broad overview of the rulemaking process
in administrative law); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001); see Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
143
See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 28; Amended Complaint, supra
note 50 (arguing that DACA was enacted without proper notice and comment per the APA,
does not have the force of law, and improperly impedes DHS officers from enforcing INA
§ 235); see also Amended Complaint, supra note 50, ¶ 50 (showing Plaintiff Doebler faced a
three-day suspension for arresting and processing an alien for a hearing rather than exercising
the “prosecutorial discretion” commanded by his supervisors).
144
Young, supra note 19, at 878 (“When executive actors add preemptive
mandates not clearly set forth in the underlying statute, the notice and deliberation facilitated
by clear textual statement is lacking.”).
145
Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 27–28 (explaining the DACA
program is a “general statement of policy” rooted in the “foreign affairs” exception to the
formal rulemaking process per the APA). Thus, even if DACA is indeed a binding rule, the
executive branch did not violate rulemaking procedures by foregoing the notice and comment
process. Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
146
Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 28; see 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). “[The
Secretary] shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and
other papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for
carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.” § 1103(a)(3).
147
See David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The
Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167 (2012)
(arguing that not only does DHS have broad prosecutorial discretion under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a), but the agency has broad discretion to not remove otherwise removable individuals
under INA § 235). Professor Martin addresses the arguments Kris Kobach set forth in Crane
142
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For the purposes of examining N.C. licenses under the preemption
framework, it is assumed that DACA does not violate any provisions of the
APA.148 It is further assumed that DACA is not the product of an improper
delegation of power and is otherwise constitutional.149 This article adopts the
argument that DACA was created pursuant to the executive branch’s broad
discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3).150
A. North Carolina Licenses Are Not Expressly Preempted by Any Federal
Statute
Express preemption occurs when Congress plainly declares a federal
law’s preemptive effect, usually through an express preemption provision.151
In such cases, the Court focuses “on the plain wording of the [express
preemption] clause,” as it is considered the “best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.”152
Based on Whiting, the N.C. licenses are not expressly preempted.
The Whiting Court only interpreted “licenses” in the context of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a, which governs employment of undocumented immigrants. 153 The
IRCA provision at issue in Whiting contained an express savings clause for

and ultimately concludes DHS properly exercised its broad discretion as an enforcement
agency. Id. Professor Martin dismisses the argument that individual ICE officers are
necessarily bound to removing individuals under INA § 235, even though DHS has already
exercised its prosecutorial discretion. Id.
148
See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3; Marguiles, supra note 19; Young,
supra note 19; Paul E. Mcgreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference
in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 845 (1995) (providing further
analysis of the federalism and administrative law issues pertaining to DACA and federal
agencies in general).
149
See Marguiles, supra note 19 (arguing the validity of DACA cannot be fully
explained by the executive exercise of prosecutorial discretion, instead DACA is justified by
the President’s power to protect “intending citizens” from violations of law by the States).
This Presidential “stewardship” arises from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Id.; Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3, at 22
(noting it is arguable that the language of INA § 103(a) pushes the limits of the non-delegation
doctrine as it may not provide an “intelligible principle” for executive action per Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)).
150
See Obama’s Ruby Slippers, supra note 3. This paper will adopt Professor
Gilbert’s argument.
151
Immigrant Laws, supra note 90, at 159.
152
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62 (2002) (holding the express
preemption clause of the Federal Boat Safety Act did not expressly preempt common law tort
claims); see also Geier, 529 U.S. 861 (holding the express preemption clause of the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act did not expressly preempt common law tort claims).
153
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973.
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business licenses.154 The Court broadly interpreted “licenses” in the federal
statute savings clause to find that LAWA was not preempted.155
The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a is inapplicable to driver’s licenses.
No provision in the INA expressly prohibits the N.C. licenses. The
Napolitano memorandum does not expressly require states to issue driver’s
licenses with uniformity. 156 The only federal statute that defines driver’s
licenses is 49 U.S.C. § 30301, which states that a “motor vehicle operator’s
license” is “a license issued by a State authorizing an individual to operate a
motor vehicle on public streets, roads, or highways.” 157 Unlike 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a, the plain language of 49 U.S.C. § 30301 does not expressly address
the type of immigration information on the face of the N.C. licenses.158 Thus,
it would seem that federal law does not expressly preempt the N.C. licenses,
as the language of the federal law does not directly address the publication of
immigration status.159

154
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012) (preempting “any State or local law imposing
civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who
employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens”).
155
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1980.
156
Napolitano, supra note 3, at 1–3.
157
49 U.S.C. § 30301(5) (2012).
158
Id.
159
REAL ID Act of 2005 § 202, H.R. 1268, Pub. L. 109-13 (providing a proposed
note to 49 U.S.C. § 30301 detailing how state driver’s licenses and identification documents
should be issued). Section 202(c)(2)(B)(viii) contemplates a situation where states issue
driver’s licenses to people with deferred action status. Id. Section 202(c)(2)(C) provides that
people with temporary status (i.e. deferred action status) may receive a temporary driver’s
license valid for the individual’s period of authorized stay or one year if the an individual is
authorized to stay in the U.S. indefinitely. Id. Interestingly, section 202(c)(2)(C)(iii) provides
that “[a] temporary driver’s license or temporary identification card issued pursuant to this
subparagraph shall clearly indicate that it is temporary and shall state the date on which it
expires.” Id. But, it is unclear how this note would impact the preemption analysis. The
language of § 202(c) does not seem to expressly preempt the N.C. licenses, because it does not
address the type of immigration information that is permitted on driver’s licenses. But see
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, No. 3:04-0613, 2005 WL 2034935 (M.D.
Tenn. Aug. 23, 2005) (finding that the REAL ID Act impliedly preempted a state statute
which provided that the “[D]epartment [of Safety] shall not accept matricula consular cards as
proof of identification for driver license application and issuance purposes” as the REAL ID
Act set forth guidance for documents that are acceptable for “federal purposes”). See also
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Countdown to Real ID (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/transport/count-down-to-real-id.aspx; 6 C.F.R. § 37
(providing applicable rules for states that issue driver’s licenses for use by federal
government).
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B. North Carolina Licenses Are Obstacle Preempted Because the Licenses
Disrupt the Federal Government’s Policy Objectives and Interfere with the
Federal Government’s Allocation of Resources
Even though federal law doesn’t expressly preempt the N.C.
licenses, implied preemption may still apply. As discussed above, the
Supreme Court’s obstacle preemption jurisprudence focuses on the federal
government’s balancing of policy goals.160 In Arizona, the Supreme Court
utilized a broad analysis of legislative history to determine the federal
government’s balance of policy goals.161
1. North Carolina Licenses Disrupt the Federal Government’s Balancing
of Policies
The Court in Arizona recognized that “a principal feature of the
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials,”
which in turn “embraces immediate human concerns.”162 DACA reflects the
federal government’s use of broad discretion to “embrace immediate human
concerns” by using federal policy to prevent the marginalization of qualified
young undocumented immigrants. Moreover, the Court in Hines emphasized
that the federal immigration system seeks to “protect the personal liberties of
law-abiding aliens . . . and to leave them free from the possibility of
inquisitorial practices and police surveillance that might not only affect our
international relations but might also generate the very disloyalty which the
law has intended guarding against.” 163 The Court in Arizona echoed the
concerns raised in Hines and struck down the provision of S.B. 1070
allowing arrest without a warrant.164
The executive branch is permitted to use its decision-making power
to balance a number of factors within the executive branch’s expertise.165
The Napolitano memorandum states the DACA program is an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion designed to prevent the removal of “productive
young people to countries where they may not have lived or even speak the

160

See infra Part III.
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505.
162
Id. at 2499 (emphasis added) (noting this prosecutorial discretion is rooted in 8
U.S.C. § 1103(a)); see Immigrant Laws, supra note 90.
163
Hines, 312 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added).
164
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506 (noting federal immigration law seeks to prevent
the “unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college student, or
someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials determine should not
be removed”).
165
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
161
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language.” 166 The federal government acknowledged that DACA grantees
entered the U.S. without authorization, but did so “[without intent] to
violate” immigration law, by providing DACA grantees only lawful
presence, not lawful status. 167 As such, the DACA program carefully
balances the government’s need to remove “high priority” criminals, while
also integrating “low priority” undocumented individuals who entered the
U.S. without fault and have developed ties to the U.S.
The N.C. licenses undercut the Obama administration’s balancing of
policy goals to integrate DACA grantees and removing high priority
criminals. The N.C. licenses prominently display DACA grantees’ lack of
permanent immigration status. The N.C. licenses overemphasize DACA
grantee’s lack of immigration status while ignoring the federal government’s
plan to integrate such individuals. Despite being technically accurate, “NO
LAWFUL STATUS” in bold red letters on the license intentionally
differentiates DACA grantees. Such an action reinforces the outsider status
of DACA grantees. 168 In highlighting the DACA grantee’s precarious
immigration status, North Carolina limits the number and size of the
communities to which immigrants without lawful status can belong. 169 In
turn, this creates a risk that DACA grantees will not apply for driver’s
licenses for fear of exposing their immigration status, which would frustrate
the government’s goal of bringing DACA grantees, productive young
immigrants, out of the shadows. Thus, the N.C. licenses disproportionately
focus on a DACA grantee’s lack of formal immigration status, which
compromises the government’s goal of discreet integration.
The Court in Arizona acknowledged the complex interaction
between a removable individual’s ties to the community and the impact of
removal orders on broader U.S. foreign policy.170 Indeed, removal decisions,
including the selection of a removed alien’s destination, may implicate the
U.S. relations with foreign powers and require consideration of changing
political and economic circumstances. 171 The dynamic nature of relations
with other countries requires the executive branch to ensure immigration
enforcement policies are consistent with U.S. foreign policy.172 Similarly, the

166

Napolitano, supra note 3, at 2; see also Martin, supra note 95 (addressing the
broad discretion that DHS and ICE enjoy in enforcing immigration law against removable
individuals and noting that such discretion is common across all enforcement agencies).
167
Napolitano, supra note 3, at 3.
168
López, supra note 17, at 104 (suggesting licenses like the N.C. license single
out the license holders, thus violating Equal Protection rights). Though Professor López uses
Equal Protection analysis, given the Court’s language in Arizona, the protection of a group of
undocumented immigrants can be a broad goal of federal action. Id.
169
See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
2037, 2079 (2008).
170
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
171
Id. (citations omitted).
172
Id.
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Court in Crosby noted that the executive branch had broad discretion in the
development of foreign policy.173
Given the Court’s broad deference to the federal government’s
control over foreign policy in Arizona, the N.C. licenses would disrupt the
government’s foreign policy goals. The DACA program reflects the federal
government’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in favor of young
individuals who should not be removed to “countries where they may not
have lived or even speak the language.”174 As such, the federal government is
ensuring that a class of individuals who will have difficulty in reintegrating
in their country of origin will not be removed. Conversely, the federal
government seeks to facilitate individuals’ integration into the U.S., the
country to which many of the affected individuals feel most connected. The
N.C. licenses undermine the integration of such individuals, which in turn,
compromises the Obama administration’s overall foreign policy goals.
Additionally, the N.C. licenses place undue attention on a DACA
grantee’s unlawful status, thereby putting them at risk of removal or
unnecessary detention. The impact of N.C. licenses on federal objectives can
be illustrated by examination of a hypothetical N.C. license holder who
encounters local law enforcement. Theoretically, a N.C. license holder can
be stopped pursuant to a “show me your papers” law or can otherwise be
stopped for any reason. If a N.C. license holder is stopped by local law
enforcement, he or she also faces the risk of encountering the § 287(g) or SCOMM detainer programs.
First, assuming the hypothetical DACA grantee is stopped pursuant
to a “show me your papers” law, the N.C. licenses ostensibly would be
173

Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381. The opinion states:
[T]he state Act undermines the President’s capacity, in this instance
for effective diplomacy. It is not merely that the differences between the
state and federal Acts in scope and type of sanctions threaten to
complicate discussions; they compromise the very capacity of the
President to speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other
governments.
Id. An example of the interaction between immigration and U.S. foreign policy is illustrated
by the relationship between the U.S. and China. In 1990, Congress debated whether to permit
Chinese students to remain in the U.S. because of persecution in China. China, in response,
accused the U.S. of interfering with its affairs, creating tension between the two nations and
within the political parties in the U.S. See Kenneth J. Franzblau, Immigration’s Impact on U.S.
National Security and Foreign Policy, U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM 2 (Oct. 1997),
www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/respapers/ii-oct97.pdf; Jim Mann, House Votes to Override Bush on
Chinese Students, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 25, 1990), articles.latimes.com/1990-01-25/news/mn966_1_chinese-students. More recently, the U.S., through both its immigration policies and
foreign policies, is competing directly with China for talented, highly educated individuals.
Peter Ford, Reverse Brain Drain: China Engineers Incentives for “Brain Gain”, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 21, 2012), www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/2012/1021/Reversebrain-drain-China-engineers-incentives-for-brain-gain/%28page %29/2. In both instances, the
federal government is making decisions about immigration policy and foreign policy to best
deal with diplomatic relations with China.
174
Napolitano, supra note 3, at 2; see also Martin, supra note 147, at 181–83.
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sufficient documentation that a DACA grantee is “lawfully present.”175 But,
the N.C. license would subject a DACA grantee to heightened police
scrutiny, as the licenses would alert local law enforcement of the DACA
grantees’ lack of formal immigration status. In which case, the local police
may choose to spend time checking with DHS to confirm the N.C. license
holder’s legal presence. Such a process would be an inefficient use of federal
resources because the federal government has already deemed these people
legally present. This inefficiency frustrates the federal policy to focus
resources on the prosecution and removal of “high priority” criminals, not
wasting law enforcement resources on “low priority” undocumented
immigrants.176
In the § 287(g) and S-COMM context, N.C. licenses may increase
the risk of wrongful detention of DACA grantees. Generally, USCIS has
stated that any information obtained to determine whether an applicant
qualifies for DACA may be shared with national security and law
enforcement agencies, including ICE, for purposes other than removal. 177
Information may be shared with ICE for national security purposes, such as
for the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense.178 Essentially, a
DACA applicant’s information is not relayed to ICE unless USCIS deems it
necessary because the applicant represents a threat to national security.
The N.C. licenses raise the concerns addressed by the Court in
Arizona because the federal government’s immigration enforcement policy
to avoid police surveillance and “unnecessary harassment” would be
undermined.179 Post-arrest federal prosecutorial discretion does not remedy
an individual’s initial interaction with local law enforcement.180 By exposing
DACA grantees’ immigration status on N.C. licenses, local law enforcement
in North Carolina and in other states risk wrongfully detaining DACA
grantees for § 287(g) and S-COMM purposes. While most states have phased
out the § 287(g) program, S-COMM has filled the void.181
There are numerous reports of errors in the § 287(g) and S-COMM
databases, which have led to the improper detainment of individuals with
legal status. 182 While the N.C. licenses provide proof of identity, they
exacerbate DHS database errors by alerting local law enforcement to an
individual’s “unlawful status” which places a DACA grantee through
175

See, e.g., S.B. 1070 § 2(B); H.B. 786 § 15A-506.
DACA grantees are especially “low priority” individuals because a grantee
must demonstrate that he or she does not have any significant criminal history to qualify for
DACA protection.
177
USCIS FAQ, supra note 32.
178
Id.
179
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
180
Motomura, supra note 56, at 1856.
181
See supra text accompanying notes 53, 57; see supra Part II.A.
182
Michele Waslin, The Secure Communities Program: Unanswered Questions
and Continuing Concerns, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Nov. 2010), http://elpasotimes.
typepad.com/files/secure_communities _updated_110410-1.pdf.
176
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needless § 287(g) and S-COMM checks despite his or her legal presence.183
This in turn frustrates the facilitation of legally justifiable detention of
individuals who, in contrast, do present a risk to the community.
Assuming a hypothetical N.C. license holder is stopped for a minor
traffic offense, local law enforcement may read the language of the N.C.
licenses and feel compelled to check the immigration status of the license
holder, even though DACA grantees are protected from removal. As such,
ICE would waste resources on DACA grantees put into § 287(g) and SCOMM checks when DHS has already declared its exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. The possibility of such waste increases in a situation where a N.C.
license holder travels to a state where DACA grantees are either not issued
licenses, such as Arizona,184or a state where DACA driver’s licenses are not
as conspicuously marked as the N.C. licenses.185 Furthermore, such action
risks “generat[ing] the very disloyalty” DACA seeks to avoid.186 Therefore,
the N.C. licenses would disrupt the federal government’s policy goals.
2. North Carolina License Holders Face Danger in Arizona Because of
Arizona’s Policy Not to Recognize DACA Grantees’ Lawful Presence
Most troubling is how a N.C. license holder would fare in
Arizona.187 Governor Brewer has steadfastly maintained DACA grantees are
not lawfully present. 188 Governor Brewer chose to ignore recent DHS
guidance reiterating that DACA grantees are lawfully present in the U.S.189
183

Id.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
185
The differing policies of states regarding DACA grantees’ drivers licenses can
cause reciprocity and consistency problems between states and result in difficulties for law
enforcement imposing out-of-state laws and also for states following state-specific reciprocity
agreements. See AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADM’RS, DRIVER LICENSING FOR
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN 2013: HOW STATES ARE REACTING AND THE EFFECTS ON THE
MOTOR VEHICLE COMMUNITY 4–8 (Nov. 20, 2013).
186
Individuals who qualify for DACA must have entered the U.S. before they
turned sixteen and may not be older than thirty-one. See supra text accompanying note 31.
Consequently, many DACA grantees are in the U.S. during a vital time during the brain and
emotional development process. Researchers are hoping to study the effect that undocumented
status has on young individuals. Erika L. Sanchez, Studies Hope to Show the Emotional Toll
on Children of Undocumented Immigrants, NBC (Mar. 25, 2013), nbclatino.com/2013/
03/25/studies-hope-to-show-the-emotional-toll-on-children-of-undocumented-immigrants/.
This paper extrapolates and assumes that living “in the shadows” as second class citizens can
cause the type of effects that the researchers are studying. In which case, resentment and a
refusal to make meaningful contributions to the U.S. caused by psychological and emotional
stress of “living in the shadows” is the type of “disloyalty” that this paper envisions.
187
See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 8 (noting, in addition to
Arizona, Nebraska has expressly stated that it would not issue DACA grantees driver’s
licenses).
188
Arizona Governor Brewer: Decision Denying Licenses Stands, KTAR NEWS
(Feb. 11 2013), ktar.com/22/1609469/Brewer-Decision-denying-licenses-stands; see supra
note 20.
189
USCIS FAQ, supra note 32.
184
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Arizona is unique in that, unlike other states, it does not recognize the legal
presence of DACA grantees.190 Thus, Arizona’s “show me your papers” law
would have an even bigger impact on N.C. license holders than other states’
“show me your papers” laws.
Arizona residents who are DACA grantees cannot receive driver’s
licenses.191 As such, Arizona DACA grantees who are stopped by local law
enforcement pursuant to S.B. 1070 must present notices from DHS or USCIS
to verify their immigration status. This in turn results in significant pressure
on DACA grantees who are protected from removal under federal law, but
are powerless when stopped pursuant to Arizona’s “show me your papers”
law. There are reports that Arizona law enforcement has arrested DACA
applicants for not presenting a driver’s license. 192 Generally, in the
immigration law context, individuals with a pending application for status
are protected from removal. 193 Thus, while DACA applicants are not
afforded the full protections provided to DACA grantees, they are
temporarily non-removable while their application is pending.
Cesar Valdes’ arrest is an anecdotal example of the impact of
Arizona’s policy. Cesar Valdes was arrested and detained by Arizona police
for violating Arizona’s “show your papers” law when he failed to a produce
a driver’s license during a traffic-related stop despite his status as a DACA
applicant. 194 He was finally released after being transferred to ICE
custody.195
The N.C. license demonstrates that an individual is a qualified
DACA grantee. In Arizona, where the lawful status of DACA grantees is not
recognized, the N.C. license will not offer any protection from local law
enforcement. Unlike Cesar Valdes, a N.C. license holder possesses a driver’s
license and is an actual DACA grantee. Given that Arizona does not
recognize the lawful presence of DACA grantees, it is not certain that
owning a license proclaiming “NO LAWFUL STATUS” would be any better
than not owning a license.196 After all, the N.C. licenses clearly state that the
license holder does not have “lawful status” in the U.S., and Arizona does
not recognize a DACA grantee’s “legal presence.” It is highly likely that if a
190

As previously noted, Nebraska is the only other state besides Arizona that does
not recognize DACA grantees as having legal presence in the U.S. See supra note 8.
191
Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06.
192
Carmen Cornejo, DACA Field Report: When DACA and SB 1070 Collide,
ILW.COM BLOGS (Nov. 20, 2012, 5:40 AM), http://blogs.ilw.com/dacafieldreport/
2012/11/when-daca-and-sb1070-collide.html.
193
Morton Memo, supra note 139; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of ICE,
on Guidance Regarding the Handling of Removal Proceedings of Aliens with Pending or
Approved Applications or Petitions (Aug. 2, 2010) (terminating removal proceedings of
persons with pending applications for status in certain instances); see also DREAM Relief:
FAQs Other Immigration Cases Robert Menendez, http://www.menendez.senate.gov/
issues/dream-relief-faqs-other-immigration-cases (last visited Feb. 4, 2013).
194
See supra note 190.
195
Id.
196
Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06.
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N.C. license holder were stopped or arrested by Arizona law enforcement,
the N.C. license would not prevent the Arizona officers from detaining the
license holder for § 287(g) and S-COMM purposes. Indeed, local police did
not respect Cesar Valdes’s right to protection from unnecessary detention as
a DACA applicant with a pending application. Instead, he was needlessly
kept in police custody before being released by ICE.197 The Arizona policy to
not recognize DACA status is at odds with federal policy to focus
immigration enforcement efforts on high priority individuals. Cesar Valdes’s
experience highlights how the N.C. licenses expose DACA grantees to the
risk of prolonged detention when Arizona law enforcement chooses to utilize
§ 287(g) and S-COMM.
By exposing DACA grantees and putting them at such a risk, the
N.C. licenses directly conflict with the federal goal of integrating DACA
grantees into American society. The licenses wrongly emphasize DACA
grantees’ lack of legal status, making them a target for unnecessary law
enforcement attention rather than facilitating their social integration.
Moreover, the N.C. licenses impede the federal government’s policy of
resource allocation, as the licenses enhance the risk of DACA grantees going
through § 287(g) and S-COMM background checks even when the DACA
grantees have not been convicted of a crime and are legally present in the
U.S., therefore are not removable. The N.C. licenses, particularly in
confluence with Governor Brewer’s executive order and S.B. 1070, are an
obstacle to the federal policy of protecting DACA grantees from removal.
V. CONCLUSION
The N.C. licenses undermine the DACA program’s objective to
integrate individuals who are “Americans in every single way but one: on
paper.” 198 In Arizona, the Supreme Court emphasized the federal
government’s “broad discretion” to “embrace immediate human concerns” in
immigration enforcement, grounded in the executive branch’s constitutional
powers.199
The language used on the licenses, despite accurately stating DACA
grantees’ immigration status, frustrates the federal government’s attempts to
“embrace immediate human concerns” by publicizing the DACA grantees’
status. Indeed, the Obama administration sought to fully integrate DACA
grantees into the U.S. by making public benefits available to them, like
driver’s licenses. The N.C. licenses impede integration by highlighting the
precarious immigration status of DACA grantees and exposing them to
heightened scrutiny by law enforcement. Moreover, N.C. licenses place
DACA grantees at risk for being detained for § 287(g) and S-COMM
197
198
199

See supra note 187.
Cushman & Preston, supra note 5.
Martin, supra note 147, at 186.
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purposes, particularly in states like Arizona, despite the government’s
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. As a result, the N.C. licenses conflict
with federal policy and disrupt the federal government’s resource allocation.
Thus, the N.C. licenses are obstacle preempted and should be rescinded.
Currently, North Carolina driver’s licenses issued to people with
non-immigrant visas already discreetly state the temporary validity period of
the licenses on the back of the licenses without conspicuously highlighting
the cardholder’s specific immigration status. 200 Discreetly placing such
information on DACA grantees’ driver’s licenses would not draw attention
to their “unlawful status.” In doing so, DACA grantees’ driver’s licenses will
contain the same information as other noncitizens. This would lower the risk
that DACA grantees will be wrongfully subjected to § 287(g) or S-COMM
programs and would conform with the federal government’s goal to integrate
DACA grantees. Therefore, North Carolina should include DACA grantees
in its current licensing scheme for noncitizens in lieu of the N.C. licenses
emphasizing their lack of lawful status.

200

Gutierrez, supra note 11.

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/3

28

